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Storying the World: A posthumanist critique of phenomenological-humanist 
representational practices in mental health nurse qualitative inquiry 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to build on my previously published critique of 
phenomenological-humanist representational practices in mental health nursing qualitative 
inquiry. I will unpack and trouble these practices from an explicitly posthumanist 
philosophical position on the basis of seminal posthumanist texts and my own single- and co-
authored work. My argument will be that researchers in mental health nurse qualitative 
inquiry, who display a phenomenological-humanist narrative bent in their writing, continually 
endorse the validity of the institutional psychiatric assumptions, practices and ways of 
representing human psychological distress. These are all explicitly rejected in more critical 
forms of qualitative inquiry in mental health, including in my own work. I will conclude that 
the use of phenomenological-humanist representational practices, in mental health nursing 
and by implication and extension other healthcare disciplines, is un-ethical, un-empathic and 
morally compromised. This is because such practices present accounts of the worlds of mental 
health service users, survivors and carers that lack necessary and sufficient levels of criticality 
and context. 
 
Keywords: Narrative Ethics, Mental Health, Nursing, Phenomenology, Qualitative Research, 
Narrative. 
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Introduction 
Over the last two decades, I have worked as a qualitative researcher, research supervisor, 
teacher, article and book writer and editor, and peer reviewer of qualitative texts for journals 
and publishing houses. As a narrative scholar, I have simultaneously promoted and critiqued 
the lived-experience paradigm in all of these contexts. I have done so partly in relation to my  
growing critical interest in mental health nurse researchers’ phenomenological-humanist 
representations of the world.  
 
Having  previously challenged  implicit philosophical assumptions apparent in such work, 
around ‘authentic voice’ related to ‘lived-experience’, from a poststructural researcher 
standpoint perspective (Grant, 2014), my aim in this paper is to extend this critique. On the 
basis of my argument that phenomenological-humanist representational practices in mental 
health nursing qualitative inquiry often lack adequate levels of theoretical and cultural 
reflexivity (Grant, 2014), I will further unpack and trouble these practices from an explicitly 
posthumanist philosophical position. I will do so on the basis of both posthumanist and 
related writing, and my own single- and co-authored publications that cohere with this 
philosophical standpoint.  
 
Posthumanism, to be defined more fully later in this paper,  assumes in brief that human 
subjective experience is plural, fragmented, unstable, incoherent and constantly shifting 
across time and space. It further assumes that human subjectivity is co-constituted by, and 
co-evolving with, other, non-human animals, and with material and non-organic entities and 
forces that both have and exert agency.  This markedly contrasts with the 
ontoepistemological position resulting from the fusion of the Husserlian phenomenological 
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assumption  of essential structures of lived experience giving meaning to the world with the 
tenets of contemporary liberal humanism. This fusion, which I describe as  phenomenological-
humanism, privileges human choice and progress in a world generally regarded as having no 
other purpose and function than serving human agency.  
 
My concern is not with the extent that authors who use phenomenological-humanist 
representational practices maintain fidelity with Husserlian and other, related, key 
philosophical principles  (Paley, 1997). Moreover I should qualify that my critique will not 
extend to the kinds of post-Husserlian developments from phenomenology that derive from 
the work of Heidegger,  Gadamer and others (Chang and Horrocks, 2008). This hermeneutic 
tradition broadly fits with my critical narrative frame of reference in eschewing objectivism, 
and emphasising the importance of context and the co-creation by researchers and 
participants of situated, inter-subjective stories of the world.  
 
In contrast, I have problems with appropriations of descriptive phenomenology deriving from 
Husserl’s writing. This is because of the implicit objectivism in these appropriations in claiming 
to identify and uncover the ‘essential structures’ of participants’ lived experiences (Lowes and 
Prowse, 2001). These structures are presented as free of both social and historical context 
and researcher contamination, having being garnered through a systematic, quasi-scientific 
process whereby previous knowledge, presuppositions and prejudices are kept at a distance.  
All of this is assumed to accord such essential structures a level of  ontological legitimacy and 
coherence that I have always found deeply unconvincing.  
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Along with others (eg Lopez and Willis,  2004), I am specifically critically interested in the ways 
in which qualitative researchers in mental health nursing display a phenomenological-
humanist narrative bent (to be clarified below) through a more or less loose and insufficiently 
scrutinised appropriation of  such Husserlian descriptive assumptions and principles.  
 
More specifically, in relation to my concerns as a narrative scholar and researcher, I am 
interested in the ways in which they use these assumptions and principles to story the world 
in their writing and the consequences of these stories.  For example, it seems to me that taken 
for granted binaries prevail in mental health nursing phenomenological-humanist qualitative 
inquiry,. The frequent use of terms such as ‘self’ and ‘identity’ usually imply coherent 
identities separate from the world which is assumed to be outside of, and relatively unrelated 
to, self. The implicitly ‘mentally well’ are divided from the ‘mentally ill’, as are the (well) 
researchers from (ill) participants. The absence of a critically reflexive commentary around 
the assumptions underpinning these terms in the context in which they appear makes it seem 
as if their use is unproblematic.  In this regard, readers of these articles are implicitly invited 
to take for granted that these assumptions and terms are necessary and  sufficient to 
accurately and fairly represent the world, topic and people under discussion, in ways that 
transcend culture, time and place.  
 
Representational insularity 
Related to the use of these terms in research narratives and to the kinds of worlds they speak 
into existence,  the people represented in these articles are often portrayed as existing in 
special kinds of macro-isolation units devoid of real life contexts. At an environmental level, 
participants and researchers are portrayed as separated and insulated from messy and 
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contradictory human organisational and social cultures. Both groups apparently often live in 
power-neutral or power silent, a-political environments, where healthcare organisations are 
represented as benign unproblematic backdrops to practice. At a cultural level, the constant 
representation of dominant societal and professional beliefs around the assumed existence 
of ‘mental illness’, obscures work that challenges this. From the contemporary critical mental 
health paradigm that I also work and write within, the disease model for making sense of the 
extremes of human misery is both scientifically unsupportable and oppressive (Grant, 2015; 
in press).  
 
From critical social and human science, and more specifically posthumanist perspectives, 
phenomenological-humanist work seems to me therefore to be constantly ethically-
compromised. It representationally insulates the people storied in it from the above contexts 
and worlds that are  fundamental to their lives, and from knowledge of the forms of, already 
robustly challenged, cultural oppression in which their lives are inscribed.  
 
Even greater levels of representational insularity are apparent in more explicitly Husserlian-
informed research articles in which the assumed privileged interior nature and qualities of 
such de-contextualised selves are often represented in quasi-religious terms. In the sacred 
quest for pure descriptions of lived experience of individual and collective perceptions of the 
world, researchers frequently write in a kind of awe-inspired biblical epistle-narrative form, 
in ways lacking in both critical distance and irony. This illustrates their apparent engagement 
in a fundamentalist quest for original untainted knowledge: 
 
 Phenomenological reduction is a return to original awareness… (In)… the recovery 
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of a pure description of the phenomenon … (describing) with scientific exactness, the 
life of consciousness in its original encounter with the world… Husserl 
(1931)…challenged individuals to go ‘back to the things themselves’ to 
recover….original awareness 
       (Rooney, 2009, 78, my brackets) 
 
The insufficient levels of critical scrutiny paid to the cultural and historical basis for these 
terms, in the narrative and representational forms in which they are used, combine with the 
dubious ethical issues around the consequences of the world they story into existence. All of 
this  seems to me to betray representational habits that beg critical scrutiny. These habits 
arguably derive from phenomenological-humanistic philosophy cohering around particular 
currently culturally hegemonic and normative, but arguably outmoded, notions of what it 
means to be human in the world in a mental health nursing research context. I will argue 
below that these habits are understandable in the face of an onto-epistemological legacy that 
stretches back over two and a half thousand years. It is therefore not surprising that many 
phenomenological-humanist nurse researchers neither recognise nor acknowledge – at least 
in print – that their writing is based on insufficiently questioned, longstanding habits. Rather, 
their work is regularly presented as reflecting timeless, transcendent, universal, foundational 
and essential psychological and material realities. 
 
Phenomenological-Humanism 
My choice of the term ‘Phenomenological-Humanism’ collapses  the ways in which Husserlian 
phenomenological assumptions have been appropriated as described above with the tenets 
of contemporary liberal humanism. The assumption of human essential structures of lived 
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experience giving meaning to the world deriving from the work of Husserl (1931), which are 
uncovered in descriptive phenomenological research, seems to closely relate to both 
humanism in its more abstract historical sense and to liberal humanism. From the historical 
perspective of Hurari (2011),  human exceptionalism emerged as the assumption that  Homo 
sapiens possess a unique and privileged nature relative to all other animals and material 
phenomena. Hurari argues that liberal humanism positions this nature as ‘humanity’ – a 
unique and sacred quality residing within each human. From a liberal humanist perspective 
in affinity with Husserlian phenomenological assumptions, the inner core of each individual is 
assumed to provide meaning about the world, and constitute the source of all experiential 
authority. 
 
 
The Vitruvian model 
How did beliefs about the ontologically privileged status of humanity and humanness  
originate, take cultural hold and develop through time? Braidotti (2013) provides a compelling 
historical analytic line of inquiry to address this question. In her view, da Vinci’s 15th century 
painting of Vitruvian Man represents the classical ideal of human embodiment, originally 
emerging from the pre-Socratic philosophical world as  both the ‘measure of all things’ and 
the ideal of bodily perfection.‘Mens sana in corpore sano’, translates as a ‘sound mind in 
health body’ and symbolises the capacity of humans to pursue individual and collective 
perfection.   
 
Braidotti argues that the fact that this is conveyed through and in an image of a white, 
European male of healthy and physically fit appearance, is an emblematic of the subsequent 
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malestream shaping of Enlightenment-derived humanism. This implicitly privileged 
androcentricity (male-centredness) over anthropocentricity (human-centredness), 
simultaneously collapsing the latter into the former as assumed biologically foundational 
givens, beyond question. As a result, a rational, morally progressive enterprise took hold, 
within which a particular ideal type of human being dominated European cultural 
development.  
 
Braidotti maintains that this dominance has endured through the centuries to our current 
times, changing in contextual meaning as a function of its constant re-inscription within 
shifting cultural formations. She argues in support of this point that as a cultural emblem the 
Vitruvian model informed the development of Enlightenment values in the 18th and 19th 
century. This re-worked the earlier ideals of classical antiquity and the Italian Renaissance in 
the service of Enlightenment cultural imperatives. Shaping up as the civilising cultural 
standard at individual and community levels, the idea of ‘Europe’ gradually cohered around 
the assumed universalizing powers of self-reflexive reason. Vitruvian ideals developed into a 
hegemonic cultural model, where ‘Europe’ meant not simply a geopolitical location but also 
a universalising mental attribute that had utility as a gold-standard colonising template.  
 
According to Braidotti, this latter meaning enabled Husserl (1970) to passionately defend 
Eurocentric reasoning powers as transcendent Humanistic universalism in the 1930s, in 
reaction to the threats of emerging fascism. Braidotti argues that in its rejection of cultural 
and historical contingency in favour of a universalising model of civilising practice, Husserl’s 
espoused Eurocentrism saturated theoretical, institutional and pedagogic practices. In 
becoming steadily imperial and colonial, the Eurocentric liberal humanist paradigm 
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conveniently functioned to make sense of the world’s peoples as ‘other’ and to subjugate 
groups of them in the service of both geopolitical and academic interests. 
 
Braidotti’s posthumanist historical analysis makes intelligible the unfortunate actual and 
potential consequences of liberal humanism’s gradual emergence as an imperial and 
colonising tool . These consequences give the lie to its more rationalised, professional and 
cultural appropriation as a form of universal virtue ethics for making sense of  and being 
respectful to people and developing communities of understanding. This appropriation has 
been evident in healthcare for decades in phenomenological-humanist qualitative research 
practices.  
 
 
Challenging liberal humanist othering representational practices  
Braidotti (2013) argues that liberal humanism,  in both its geopolitical and research  
application, is imperial in fulfilling the assumed expansionist rights and interests of some 
powerful groups while denying the rights and interests of less powerful others. To the extent 
that it is colonising in both geopolitical and research terms, it engages in ‘othering’ practices. 
This signals judgements of inferiority and less-than humanness, made about some people and 
populations. In this analytic context, phenomenological-humanist representational practices 
predicated on ‘well-sick’ and ‘normal-pathological’ terms, no matter how well-intentioned, 
arguably often condemn to the status of ‘othered’ all those who fail to measure up to 
normative, hegemonic healthcare cultural standards.  
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My single- and joint-authored qualitative and theoretically driven work has challenged these 
binarying representational practices. For example, our narrative inquiry work explores the 
ways in which institutional psychiatry often imposes scientifically deeply flawed (Grant, 2015; 
Smith and Grant, in press), and pejorative narratives and labels on people in the name of 
‘treatment’ and ‘care’ in the UK institutional psychiatric system. This serves to maintain an 
indefensible cultural binary between ‘mental illness’ and ‘wellness’ (Grant, 2015; Smith and 
Grant, in press).  
 
As I will discuss in more detail later, we have used critical, highly reflexive and contextual 
storytelling and dialogical narrative analysis to show how mental health ‘survivors’ often re-
story themselves in ways independent of institutional psychiatry. They do so in order to 
achieve a degree of emancipation and distance from these normative practices and services 
(eg Grant and Leigh-Phippard, 2014; Grant et al., 2015). Moreover, in framing some of this 
work  within a Queer Theoretical paradigm (Grant, 2015; Grant and Leigh-Phippard, 2014; 
Grant et al., 2015; Zeeman et al.,  2014a,b), we have discussed and provided exemplars of the 
ways in which healthcare workers, researchers and service users and carers can re-inscribe 
aspects of being human –  often pathologised and stigmatised at cultural, institutional and 
disciplinary levels – within liberatory structures of difference rather than normative 
biomedical and cultural structures of ‘ill health’, ‘pathology’ or ‘deviance’. 
 
Those who are othered, who fall short of culturally normative standards of acceptability, are 
often either brought into line with those standards or excluded through discrimination and 
stigmatisation. Examples of this are legion in a mental health context, and specifically 
apparent in the work cited above and in our earlier collection of mental health user, carer and 
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survivor narratives (Grant et al., 2011). At an applied disciplinary level, this has crucial 
implications for nursing qualitative research. Phenomenological-humanist representational 
practices often simultaneously  assume the validity of biomedical models of extreme 
psychological distress as a legitimising back story or master narrative.  From a critical 
posthumanist perspective, the use of terms such as ‘mental illness’, ‘symptoms’ and 
‘schizophrenia’ function in the service of maintaining cultural hegemony and normativity to 
the disadvantage of some people and populations.  
 
The phenomenological-humanist binary apparent in ‘researcher-researched’ and 
‘professional-patient’  arguably also contributes to maintaining such a cultural divide. This 
binary has been undermined recently in my own work and the work of a colleague in relational 
autoethnographic writing where the researchers and the researched are the same people, 
who celebrate a postcolonial hybrid identity status as both mental health researchers-
professionals and service-users or survivors of the UK institutional mental health system 
(Grant et al., 2015; Williams, 2015).  
 
Posthumanism 
In the light of the argument to this point, far from being transcendent, the ‘human’ of 
phenomenological-humanism has the status of a culture-, profession- and paradigm-serving, 
historically contingent construct. This construct has settled over the centuries into a kind of 
unquestioned social convention in the public and academic consciousness – in short, a habit 
of thinking about, acting towards and representing people in their worlds  that, although it 
has paid cultural dividends over the centuries, has long exceeded its contemporary relevance.  
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Barad (2007), Butler (1990) and Foucault (1995, 1998) reject the fundamental assumptions 
that form the basis of this habit set. The idea that a human identity is essentially, singularly 
and coherently formed prior to its inscription within separate sociocultural and material 
formations is robustly contested. These posthumanist thinkers view the subjective experience 
of being human as plural and fragmented; as socially, geographically, materially, organically, 
ecologically and temporally contingent and unstable; as co-evolving with sociocultural and 
material formations; and as produced within, rather than producing, meaning, performance, 
practice and multiple representational structures, or ‘discourses’, which constantly change in 
line with the complex reconfiguration of cultures, times and places.  
 
In illustration of this point, Butler (1990) argue that we should think more in terms of 
subjectivity rather than identity. Whereas ‘identity’ in a liberal humanist sense suggests 
individual agency relatively free from the constraints of culture and social and material 
structures, ‘subjectivity’ implies the dual sense of being constituted and produced within and 
by the cultural,  social and material, while having sufficient agency to ‘answer back’ and 
relatively resist such discursive shaping forces. From this perspective, phenomena like gender, 
sexuality or mental health status are not attributes or essential properties of people, but a 
kind of becoming or performed activity, reinforced through repeated action and conformity 
or resistance to cultural pressures.  
 
Foucault argues similarly throughout his writing, asserting that different historical conditions 
call forth different kinds of subjectivities. In Foucault’s terms, this occurs as a result of the 
constant repetition of specific acts in the context of institutional and cultural practices. This 
both empowers bodies, and ensures that individuals are policed and police themselves in 
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their lives and relationships to ensure relative conformity to normative cultural practices 
(Foucault, 1998). 
 
 It is important at this point to stress, after Barad (2007) that subjective agency in relation to 
cultural practices and discourse does not imply a separation between humans and human 
culture and the material and non-material world in posthumanist thinking. Barad employs the 
term ‘material-discursivity’ to highlight the fact that the material and non-material world 
produces, co-evolves with and is co-implicated in human meaning, experience and action.  
 
In this sense, her parallel use of the term ‘intra-action’ contrasts with what is normally, and 
in phenomenological-humanist terms, regarded as inter-action. Interaction presumes the 
prior, transcendent, existence of independent entities. Intra-action does not.  Qualitative 
researchers are bound up, inseparably, in all that they study, at all levels, so distinctions 
between subjects and object in the research process are enacted in, rather than inherent 
properties of, the world.  
 
In this sense and context, ‘agency’ is a dispersed phenomenon, rather than the property of 
individual human actors. The non-human and material world matters in an active sense. 
Buildings, technology and non-human animals are very much part of intra-action and the 
enactment of reality. From a posthumanist perspective therefore, agency is not a property or 
attribute, but the ongoing, unstoppable reconfigurings of the world, which is constantly 
engaged in the process of articulating itself differently. 
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So, the reality of the world is less to be found in the essential  identities of individuals in a 
phenomenological-humanist  representational sense, and more in sets of time- and place-
bound discursive-material practices. In this context, reported ‘lived-experience’ retains its 
importance for mental health nursing qualitative inquiry, although not in the ‘naïve realist’ 
phenomenological-humanist sense of literally revealing the essential meaning characteristics 
of participants’ lives (Grant, 2014). Rather, participants’ and researchers’ narratives give 
access to the ways in they, as are all of us, are more or less caught up in enacted structures 
of power emanating from their constant inscription within multiple and often contradictory 
cultural discourses, sometimes called ‘master narratives’.  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the stories told by participants in qualitative health 
research articles can range from displaying, replicating  and re-circulating these master 
narratives, to contesting and violating them (Frank, 2015; Grant et al., 2015). Recent examples 
of this in my own writing display the ways in which mental health survivors have resisted 
staying ‘narratively entrapped’ in diagnostic and pejorative psychiatric narratives by 
‘restorying’ themselves through the use of reflexive autoethnographic writing methods 
(Grant et al., 2013).  This has helped them to resist what they perceived as the oppressive 
colonization of their identities and lives by institutional psychiatric services and practices, in 
favour of exercising a greater degree of freedom over their future existential choices (Grant 
and Leigh-Phippard, 2014; Grant et al., 2015). To develop a point made earlier, these choices 
often explicitly reject the normative expectations imposed on mental health service users, 
which are enshrined in mental health nursing practice at policy, professional and research 
levels. Survivors may, for example, refuse diagnoses, psychiatric medication, and withhold 
information from psychiatrists in the interests both of maintaining personal integrity and 
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keeping institutional psychiatric services at a safe distance (Grant and Leigh-Phippard, 2014; 
Grant et al., 2015). 
 
Concluding comments: ethical challenges in representational practices 
I have previously argued that much qualitative inquiry in mental health nursing, - especially 
that conducted in the name of uncovering and describing  ‘lived experience’ – portrays the 
opposite of survivor re-storying (Grant, 2014). It does so in a kind of bland conformity, where 
research practices and representational conventions continually endorse the validity of the 
institutional psychiatric assumptions that are explicitly rejected in more critical forms of 
qualitative inquiry in mental health (Grant, 2015; Smith and Grant, in press).  
 
In the qualitative themes in much of the phenomenological-humanist research I read, a kind 
of constant and reassuring rehearsal of the familiar and the expected is apparent. This 
functions simultaneously as a form of avoidance – of the nature, effects and impact of power, 
politics and contingent nature of life, on people suffering the extremes of human misery, 
either directly or as carers, and other people engaged in researching this suffering. Thus 
phenomenological-humanist accounts constitute a pretence of representing the world with 
much of its interesting, dynamic and disturbing aspects airbrushed out. Such stories are 
deficient in the levels of criticality that I believe are represented in both my own work, and 
the work  of my colleagues and associates,  and in paying necessary and sufficient attention 
to  the contexts of the lives of mental health service users and survivors (Grant, 2015, Smith 
and Grant, in press), and carers (Klevan et al., 2016).  
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Moreover, by privileging human agency to the extent that this obscures social and material 
shaping forces, phenomenological-humanist representational practices in qualitative inquiry 
in mental health nursing  and, by extension, other health disciplines, are arguably 
fundamentally unethical. The act of ignoring the world, as though it could go away, and 
pretending to a supposedly limitless capacity of agency and lived experience to transcend and 
overcome social and material structures, or ignoring the importance of these structures 
relative to the assumed significance of lived experience, feeds back into curricular and other 
practices in mental health  which perpetuate the normative and the oppressive.  
 
This representational stance is  also arguably un-empathic to the extent that it colludes with 
the idea of  locating mental health difficulties exclusively within individuals. This ignores the 
role of social, material, organisational, professional, corporate and ideological practices, in 
both causing and worsening the experience of  psychological distress  among mental health 
service users, carers and survivors (Grant, 2015; Smith and Grant, in press). Such neglect, 
apparent in qualitative work that, because of the insufficiently examined philosophical 
assumptions reflected in its representational practices, constantly needs to respond to the 
following set of charges: it is naïve realist, de-contextual, philosophically and theoretically 
under-scrutinised, and insular and un-reflexive at mental health professional, and research 
disciplinary and representational levels (Grant, 2014). 
 
Finally, phenomenological-humanist accounts do not fare well in the broader context of 
narrative ethics. At worst, through lacking context and criticality, they present a world where 
users, survivors, carers and significant others in their lives are stripped of vitally important 
family and community meanings that need to be preserved in both research and related 
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recovery interventions. Because these meanings accord sense, nuance and importance to the 
worlds such people and communities live in, representationally depriving them of knowledge 
of these worlds, and of the power relations that govern them, amounts to a form of narrative 
violence.  Such  writing therefore falls foul of ‘guilt by omission.’ This is a troubling and serious 
issue: Loy (2010) reminds us that different stories told about the world have different 
consequences, and this is by no means a morally neutral state of affairs. 
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